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Abstract 
This study aims to assess the accountability outcomes of selected GLCs. Based on 102 responses received the findings revealed 
that the mean score of each accountability items were above the mid-point. This has indicated that Malaysian GLCs are serious in 
implementing accountability concept in their daily activities. Most respondents agreed their organization utilized  funds properly 
and in the manner authorized; have a clear operating goals to be achieved every year; ensures there is a strategy for regular and 
effective communication with all stakeholders such as  public, customers, funders.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Accountability conveys an image of trustworthiness and transparency of the organization to the public (Pitima, 2006; 
Bovens, 2007). It also present as one of a good governance criteria.  Board of directors should be accountable to 
shareholders and the management should be accountable with the board of directors (Blair and Stout, 2001). In order to 
ensure this accountability, the board of directors must always be accessible to shareholders inquiry concerning their key 
decisions affecting the company’s strategic direction (Schillemans, 2011). Boards are by definition the internal 
governing mechanism that shapes firm governance, given their direct access to the two other axes in the corporate 
governance triangle: managers and shareholders (owners). Boards of directors are one of the important criteria of 
corporate governance reform. In effect, the board of directors has emerged as both a target of blame for organization 
misdeeds and as the source capable of improving corporate governance (Aguilera, 2005).  
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Based on the Auditor General’s Report, 2010, it was stated that the board of directors component in the several 
numbers of Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) in Malaysia are not independence and lack of professional 
qualification (“Auditor General’s Report,” 2010). From the report, it seems that some of the board of directors in 
Malaysian GLCs is less efficient and it could lead to the accountability problem. GLCs performance is very crucial 
since the investments of monies are coming from the public. Thus, the public will be expecting that the fund are to be 
manage, used and invested properly without any wastage and misused. The fundamental of accountability can be 
delivered through building the confidence of the stakeholders and the public.   
In addition, there is an unprecedented result in Malaysian general election held in 2008, where the Opposition front 
manage to capture five (out of 13 states) key states in Malaysian Peninsula to form the State Governments (Bakar, 
Saleh, and Mohamad, 2011). From the election’s result, it proof that the public call for a change towards more 
transparent and accountable government. Consequently, as the Federal Government now, they need to strengthen the 
rules and regulations and to have a stronger checks-and-balances’ system as to meet the public’s expectations. Thus, in 
the case of GLCs, they also need to strive to be more transparent and accountable because they also apart of government 
which the government use the public money to invest in such companies. As such this study aims to assess 
accountability outcomes of GLCs.   
 
2. Government-linked companies 
 
Government-linked companies (GLCs) are controlled by the Malaysian government via the Federal Government-
linked Investment companies (GLICs). GLCs can be defined as companies that have a primary commercial objective 
and in which the Malaysian government has a direct controlling stake. Controlling stake can be refers to the percentage 
ownership by the government or the government’s ability to appoint the Board of Director, the senior management and 
make a major decisions for example contract awards, strategy, restructuring and financing, acquisition and divestment 
for GLCs either directly or through GLICs.  Whereby, GLICs are companies that allocate the government funds to the 
GLCs such as Khazanah Nasional Berhad, Pension Trust Funds, Employees Provident Fund, and Permodalan Nasional 
Berhad. 
Previously, GLCs were known as government agencies or public enterprises to provide services for social purposes. 
However, in the early 1980s, Malaysia’s privatization police were being introduced resulted from the objectives of the 
New Development policy, the rising national debt as well as from the belief that it would drive the government agencies 
to become more efficient and cost effective (Mohd Alwi and Abdul Khalid, 2009). The government still holds a 
significant controlling stake even though the companies were being privatized. Subsequently, the performance of GLCs 
becoming important issue in Malaysia. In 2012 alone the Malaysian Government has invested RM30.599 billion in 56 
GLCs. Thus, with this investment made by the government, the public is expected that the investment provides return 
and GLCs are more accountable in utilizing the fund. 
The important role of GLCs for Malaysian economy is proved as GLCs constitute 49% of the Bursa Malaysia of 
market capitalization. Putrajaya Committee on GLCs High Performance (PCG) reported that the 17 GLCs  recorded an 
all-time high net income of RM 20.1bil from only RM9bil in 2004 reflecting a growth of 18.2% per annum. PCG also 
reported that the total shareholders’ return on FBM KLCI outperformed the non-G20 by 0.8% per annum, growing at 
13.7%. The market capitalization more than doubled to RM319bil from RM140bil over the same period and delivered a 
return on equity of 11.8% in 2011, up from 10.6% in 2010  
Despite exemplary achievement of a group of leading GLCs, an Overview of 2011 National Audit Report Initiatives 
and Updates Related to State Owned Corporations, 28.6% of the GLCs showed a loss amounted to RM1.720bil. The 
National Audit Department indicate that 11 GLCs was suffered at lost for the year ended 2008 until 2010. The losses 
are due to the several factors including the unsuccessful of business strategy (Lau and Tong, 2008). Based on the report, 
if the GLCs continue to be non-performer, it can taint up the GLCs’ reputation and later will harm the public trust on 






296   Jamaliah Said and Nur Hidayah Binti Jaafar /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  145 ( 2014 )  294 – 299 
3. Research Problem 
 
GLCs play an important role in enhancing the economic growth in Malaysia. Thus, approaching to year 2020, 
Malaysia aims to be progress and high-income nation, to be able in attracting outside investors and to be able to 
compete on a regional and global stage. Hence, in order to achieve this vision, the cooperation and contribution from 
the private sector and the government are very important. The government will provide the fund to invest in the GLCs 
to ensure that the GLCs perform well. But, if the fund is not properly used and managed, it will contribute to the losses 
which could tarnish the public trust. 
However, the public perception on the GLCs in Malaysia has been ruined by the poor performance of the key 
players, such as Malaysia Airlines System (MAS) and Proton Holdings Berhad (Lau and Tong, 2008). MAS had 
plunged into losses in three consecutive years begin in 2004 with RM326. This loss is increasing in 2005 with 
amounted to RM 1.251. This is due to the excessive cost over its sales generated during the year. Meanwhile, in 2006, 
the losses is reduce by RM134 million respectively. However the losses still incurred in 2010 and 2011 by RM237 
million and RM2.5 billion respectively, even though the MAS is in process in implementing the business turn around 
process (MAS, 2012). Proton Holdings Berhad also showed a poor performance when the share price of Proton 
Holdings in year 2006 fell sharply due to the Volkswagen dropped plans to invest in the organization. As a result, 
Proton Holding suffered a pretax loss of RM240.5 million in 2006. Proton also suffered for losses before tax before 
government grant for three consecutive years beginning 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011, this was varnish the perception of 
public in regards to the creditability of Proton as a first car producer in Malaysia (Proton, 2011). 
According to Auditor General’s Report, 2010, it was found out that several numbers of GLCs are still lacking of 
accountability in the corporate activities due to the lack of board effectiveness in the organization. It was stated that the 
board of directors’ component in the several numbers of Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) in Malaysia are not 
independence and lack of professional qualification. This report has proof that the GLCs in Malaysia are still lacking of 
board effectiveness in the organization.  
Furthermore, Malaysian government election in 2008 showed an unexpected result where the opposition manages to 
capture five out of 13 states in Malaysia (Bakar et al., 2011). This result had proved that there is an increasing public 
awareness for a government to be more transparent and accountable in the public matter. The government has to 
promote a greater accountability by strengthening the internal control practices in the Ministries and also in the GLCs as 
to gain back the public trust. In addition, there is a little study that has been carried out in Malaysia regarding the 




The Malaysian High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (Finance Committee, 1999, p. 52) defines 
the term as: 
“…Corporate governance is the process and structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of the 
company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing 
long-term shareholders value, whilst taking into account the interests of other stakeholders…”.   
Every citizen all over the world have been demanded for a greater accountability from their government (Bracci and 
Llewellyn, 2012; Bovens, 2007; Kolk, 2011). Bovens (2007) had distinguished five different dimensions of 
accountability such transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility and responsiveness. He also stated that in these 
five dimensions each icon has their own umbrella concepts themselves. There is an arguments where Mo (2001) stated 
that privatization increases the degree of public accountability. However, there is also an argument, where privatization 
will reduce the degree of public accountability. Hence, Mo (2001) conducted this study to investigate this matter. To 
examine the issue, the author use both qualitative and quantitative methods, where qualitative method, he had analyzed 
five international cases of bus operations; a franchise system of Seoul, Korea, a pure public system of the New York 
City Transit Authority (NYCTA), a franchise system of New York City Department of Transportation (NYCDOT), a 
competitive tendering system in London and a pure privatization case of “Outside London” in the UK. For the 
quantitative analysis, this study has collected data on U.S bus systems through an extensive survey and it has utilized 
the National Transit Database (NTD) of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA).   
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Past study on the accountability outcomes produced conflicting findings. A group of studies discovered high level of 
accountability being practiced in their sample organizations whereas another group of studies discovered opposite 
results. In line with studies carried out by Barrett (2008), Geer (2009) and Shaoul, Stafford, and Stapleton (2012) this 
study aims to assess the level of accountability practices by GLCs in Malaysia. 
 
 




This study was conducted among Malaysian Government-linked companies (GLCs). In this study, 462 databases of 
GLCs are developed based on information available from website. At the same time, numerous telephone calls were 
made to get the names full address and the respective person of the GLCs. This was done one week prior to the mailing 
of the questionnaires. A total of 462 sets of questionnaire were distributed to the accountant of state and federal level 
GLCs.  
 
5.2 Measurement of Accountability 
 
The questionnaire requires respondents to express their opinion on the level of accountability in the organization. 
The questionnaires were adopted with some modifications from several studies to reflect all those accountability 
outcomes of GLCs. The studies were from Barrett (2008), Geer (2009) and Shaoul, Stafford, and Stapleton (2012). 
Respondents are requested to answer by using a seven point Likert-type scales from “strongly disagree” to “strongly 




Part 1 of the questionnaires asked questions related to respondents’ demographic profile. Out of 102 questionnaires 
received, 58 (56.9%) of the respondents are female and 44 (43.1%) are the male. Majority of the respondents were 
below 30 years old (51%), followed by the age between 30 to 40 years old which carry 37.3% and the rest of the 
respondents were more than 40 years old (11.7%). The job position can be categorized into 4 levels which are top 
management, middle management, lower management and the support staff. The majority of the respondents are from 
middle management 54 (52.9%) respondents followed by top management 40 (39.2%) and lower management which 
around 8 (7.8%). 
  








Ensures funds are used properly and in the manner authorized. 6.80 1 
Sets clear operating goals to be achieved every year. 6.01 2 
Comply to procedure and requirement for fund disbursement. 5.82 3 
Recognises the organisation’s responsibilities towards its wider communities, society and t
environment. 
5.71 4 
Fosters collaboration with other related agencies as well as other types of organizations. 5.56 5 
Produces several performance measures concerning the quality of services delivered. 5.51 6 
Maintain detailed and up-to-date records for supplies, office equipment and other Department 5.45 7 
Supports the process of learning from mistakes and successes, ensuring external views a
taken into account. 
5.37 8 
Provides complaints and redress mechanisms. 5.34 9 
Provides transparent financial information for public view 5.32 10 
Develop financial and non-financial measures 5.31 11 
Develop adequate internal control systems  5.24 12 
Upholds and applies the principles of equality and diversity and ensures that we are fair a
open to all sections of the communities 
5.20 13 
Practices transparent reward systems to employees 4.98 14 
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To measure the level of accountability in the GLCs in Malaysia, fourteen  questions were asked. Respondents were 
required to express their agreement/disagreement based on seven points likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree). The mean score were obtained by averaging the respective scores for the questions.  
Table 1 exhibit the findings of the study. The highest mean score was top management of my organization ensures 
funds are used properly and in the manner authorized with a mean score of 6.80. This indicates that most respondent 
agrees top management in their organizations are accountable for fund allocated. This is followed by top management 
of my organization sets clear operating goals to be achieved every year (mean =6.01). The mean score on whether the 
top management in their organization comply to procedure and requirement for fund disbursement has scored the third 
highest mean score (mean = 5.82).  
However, the respondents feels that  the top management in their organization is not very  transparent in paying a 
reward systems to employees  (mean =4.98 )and their organization needs to upholds and applies the principles of 
equality and diversity and ensures that we are fair and open to all sections of the communities (5.20). Similarly, the 




Government, as well as other public sector organizations, has use more and more sophisticated accountability 
measures to improve their organization performance in the past several years, however many citizens still have doubts 
about them and believe they are still not accountable. Hence, this study examined the level of accountability among 
GLCs in Malaysia. Accountability items were adopted with modification from previous studies such as Barrett (2008), 
Geer (2009) and Shaoul, Stafford, and Stapleton (2012).  
The finding has provided evident on the level of accountability outcomes of GLCs. The average score for each 
accountability outcomes were all above mid-points indicating Malaysian GLCs are serious in promoting a greater 
accountability by ensuring funds are used properly and in the manner authorized; Sets clear operating goals to be 
achieved every year; Comply to procedure and requirement for fund disbursement; Recognises the organisation’s 
responsibilities towards its wider communities, society and the environment; Fosters collaboration with other related 
agencies as well as other types of organizations; Produces several performance measures concerning the quality of 
services delivered; Maintain detailed and up-to-date records for supplies, office equipment and other Department; 
Supports the process of learning from mistakes and successes, ensuring external views are taken into account. Thus, 
since the GLCs are performing well, this will embedded trust on the public for the better way of the government in 
managing the public funds.  
This study is not without limitations. First, to measure accountability level respondents were asked to rate 
subjectively on a seven point Likert scale for all items listed in the questionnaire. These evaluations will subject to 
personal bias and judgment error. Thus, future research should include data collection from multiple sources which can 
also be a tool of balance check between the respondents and the actual result. Second, this study provides cross-
sectional picture at a single point in time, which means the recommendations are applicable only if external variables 
are unaffected. External variables could be environment, economic, rules and policies and others. Nevertheless, the 
findings of the factors affecting GLCs performance do shed light on the understanding of the impact of board 
effectiveness, internal control practices and leadership qualities. Third, the sample was drawn from a single industry, 
namely GLCs. Although this sampling frame allowed to control for environment factors and to provide results for major 
sector, the findings may not be relevant or generalizable to other sector. Replication of this study by future research on 
GLCs or federal /state owned enterprise in other countries and in different government jurisdictions would help to 
determine the generalizable of the combined influences other factors on accountability.  
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